The Effects of Bureaucrat-Bashing On Citizens’ Support for Public Employees

Scholars have posited that bureaucrat bashing undermines Americans’ support for public programs (Haque 1998, Garrett, Thurber et al. 2006, Barth 2010), their interest in a career in public service (Ingraham and Peters 1988, Baldwin 1990, Garrett, Thurber et al. 2006, Mann 2006), and their support for work benefits for public employees (Roberts 2012). Despite these claims, however, no empirical studies have quantitatively examined the effects of bureaucrat bashing on citizens’ attitudes towards public employees. This paper empirically examines the effects of bureaucrat bashing on citizens’ attitudes towards public employees. I find that bureaucrat-bashing from citizens reduces support for tenure, the likelihood that respondents’ would recommend a career as a public school teacher, and respondents’ perceived prestige of a career as a public school teacher. Bureaucrat-bashing from elected officials reduces respondents’ perceived prestige of a career as a public school teacher.
In the more than two centuries since America’s founding, the United States has dramatically expanded its bureaucracy in an effort to address major challenges such as industrialization, poverty, war, and disease, which threaten national prosperity and peace. As public bureaucracies have proven essential for combating public crises, violent rebellion is no longer viewed as a legitimate response to perceived bureaucratic overreach. Instead, skepticism and antipathy towards public bureaucracies and bureaucrats is now frequently expressed through bureaucrat-bashing. Consisting of verbal and non-verbal forms of communication, it challenges the work ethic, competence, accountability, and/or motives of a subgroup of public employees.

The American colonists challenged the motives and the accountability of public bureaucrats—not their work ethic or competence—given that hard work and competence only have meaning insofar as public bureaucracies are viewed as legitimate. The colonists challenged the very legitimacy of bureaucracy as means for organizing government (Lowery 1993). However, since America’s founding public bureaucracies have gained greater legitimacy, so now criticisms of public bureaucrats target their competence and work effort as well.

**Public School Teachers as Street-Level Bureaucrats**

In this essay I examine whether the bureaucrat-bashing of public school teachers affects citizens’ support for public school teachers. Public school teachers are an important case study for understanding the effects of bureaucrat-bashing, for three main reasons.

First, public school teachers are bureaucrats. Goodsell (2003) defines bureaucrats simply as “civilian government employees” (p. 84). Second, public school teachers are often accused of exhibiting qualities that are stereotypical of bureaucrats. Bureaucrats are often portrayed as lazy, unaccountable, selfish, and/or incompetent (Montgomery 1979, Baldwin 1990, Hubbell 1991, Wright 2001, Van de Walle 2004, Christensen and Lægreid 2005). Scholars and journalists
writing about the teaching profession often claim that public school teachers are subject to similar stereotypes. Dana Goldstein notes this in her bestselling book, *The Teacher Wars*, writing, “Today the ineffective tenured teacher has emerged as a feared character, a vampiric type who sucks tax dollars into her bloated pension health care plans, without much regard for the children under her care” (Goldstein 2014, p.4).

In light of such negative stereotypes, public school teachers are often distrusted by the public. As the public signals greater distrust towards public school teachers, elected officials take greater authority over how public school teachers do their jobs (Wilson 1989). The more public school teachers lose authority over their profession, the more their work is bound by rules and regulations. As a consequence, public school teachers fit another stereotype of bureaucrats: being driven by rules and procedures rather than by the individualized concerns of their clients (Wilson 1989).

Third, public school teachers have a sizable impact on society. Public school teachers are the largest subcategory of public employees with nearly 3.1 million¹ public school teachers nationwide. Uniformed military personnel represent the second largest subcategory of public employees with nearly 1.5 million² uniformed military personnel worldwide, a little less than half the number of public school teachers. Additionally, elementary and secondary education represent the largest expenditure for state and local government with 21.9% of state and local general expenditures going to elementary and secondary education³. The second and third

largest categories of state and local general expenditures are public welfare, which represents 18.8% of spending, and higher education, which represents just 10% of spending⁴.

Public school teachers’ importance is apparent in the high volume of well-regarded texts using them as a case study for understanding bureaucratic behavior and public administration more broadly. *Bureaucracy* by James Q. Wilson, *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services* by Michael Lipsky, and *Cops, Teachers, Counselors: Stories from the Front Lines of Public Service* by Steven Williams Maynard-Moody and Michael Craig Musheno, are just a few among many publications that examine public school teachers as a means to understand bureaucratic behavior.

**Hypotheses and Foundational Theories**

Given that the literature on the effects of bureaucrat-bashing is thin, it is unclear whether bureaucrat-bashing will affect citizens’ attitudes towards public employees. I explore two competing hypotheses below. First, I hypothesize that bureaucrat-bashing will not affect citizens’ attitudes towards public employees, and I provide theories from the literature to substantiate this claim. Second, I hypothesize that bureaucrat-bashing will reduce citizens’ support for public employees, and I substantiate this claim with theory.

Bureaucrat-bashing may not affect citizens’ attitudes towards public employees for three main reasons. First, “people tend to resist arguments that are inconsistent with their political predispositions, but they do so only to the extent that they…perceive a relationship between the message and their predispositions” (Zaller 1992, p.44, Bartle 1997, Bartle 2000, Palmer and Duch 2001, Hobolt 2005). John Zaller calls this the resistance axiom (Zaller 1992). If people are predisposed to view public school teachers favorably, then they will resist messages
that cast teachers in a negative light, if they are able to connect the message with their predispositions about teachers.

Second, “individuals, especially well-informed ones, may possess large stores of preexisting considerations…so that even if some new considerations…are internalized, their effects will be swamped out by the effects of previously formed considerations” (Zaller 1992, p.121, Huo 2005, Claassen 2011). Zaller terms this the inertial resistance axiom (Zaller 1992). Even if citizens internalize the bashing of public school teachers, the effects of the bashing will be washed out by the effects of citizens’ preexisting thoughts about public school teachers, should they have them.

Third, an individual’s willingness to accept a message is dependent in part upon the perceived credibility of the source (Pornpitakpan 2004, James and Petersen 2017, James and Van Ryzin 2017). Therefore, if the bashing of public school teachers comes from a source that an individual believes lacks credibility, that individual will not internalize the message. This finding is important given that few Americans view politicians as honest or ethical, and politicians may not be viewed as a credible source as a consequence. A 2012 Gallup poll asked a representative sample of Americans to rate the honesty and ethics of Members of Congress, Senators, and State governors. Only 20 percent of the respondents rated State governors as very high or high in honesty and ethics, only 14 percent rated Senators as very high or high in honesty and ethics, and only 10 percent rated Members of Congress as very high or high in honesty and ethics (2012).

Americans generally have more favorable views of the ‘American people’ in the aggregate than they do of politicians. A 2016 Gallup poll asked a representative sample of Americans to rate how much trust they have in the ‘American people’ and ‘politicians.’ Fifty-six
percent of respondents stated that they have a great deal or fair amount of trust in the ‘American people,’ whereas only forty-two percent of respondents stated that they have a great deal or fair amount of trust in ‘politicians’ (2016). Therefore, bashing that comes from citizens might be viewed as providing more credible information than bashing that comes from politicians.

Based on the three theories outlined above, several factors increase the likelihood that bureaucrat-bashing will affect an individual’s attitudes. First, the message of bashing must not be incongruent with the individual’s preexisting beliefs. Second, the individual must be able to connect the message with their attitudes towards the subject (in this case, public school teachers). Third, the individual must not have large stores of preexisting beliefs or considerations about the message. Lastly, the message must come from a source that the individual views as credible. If any of these conditions are not met, bureaucrat-bashing is less likely to affect an individual’s attitudes.

Conversely, there are also reasons to posit that the bureaucrat-bashing of public school teachers will reduce support for public school teachers. I hypothesize that bureaucrat-bashing signals to the public that public school teachers are performing poorly, and consequently, citizens’ reduce their support for public school teachers. This hypothesis is based on micro-performance theory, which posits that bad performance by bureaucrats reduces support for bureaucrats (Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003). Numerous studies have found statistically significant relationships between bureaucratic performance and attitudes towards bureaucrats (Brown and Reed Benedict 2002, Anderson and Tverdova 2003, Van Ryzin 2011, Houston, Aitalieva et al. 2016).

Anderson and Tverdova (2003), for example, used data from the 1996 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) to determine what factors affect citizens’ trust in civil servants
across 16 democracies. In line with their hypothesis, the authors found that countries with higher levels of corruption were less trusting of civil servants. Thus, Anderson and Tverdova’s (2003) research provides some evidence that bureaucratic performance, as measured by country-level measures of corruption, affects citizens’ attitudes towards civil servants.

Van Ryzin (2011) built on the work of Anderson and Tverdova (2003) by developing two more sophisticated measures of bureaucratic performance—process performance and outcomes performance—and assessing their relative influence on trust in civil servants across 33 nations. Assessments of process performance and outcomes performance were measured at the individual level and the country level based on data from the 2006 ISSP, the 2006 World Bank Governance Indicators, and the 2006 UN Human Development Index.

Van Ryzin (2011) found that process performance was positively correlated with citizens’ trust in civil servants in every model, whether measured at the individual level or the country level. Outcomes performance was positively correlated with citizens’ trust in civil servants in every model except one. Furthermore, Van Ryzin (2011) found that process performance had a larger effect than outcomes performance in nearly every model.

These findings provide three important insights. First, they indicate that processes performance and outcomes performance—affect citizens’ attitudes towards civil servants, not only corruption. Second, these results provide evidence that individual-level measures of bureaucratic performance effect citizens’ attitudes towards civil servants and not simply country-level measures. Third, these findings also suggest that process performance has a greater effect on citizens’ attitudes towards civil servants than outcomes performance.

Houston, Aitalieva et al. (2016) built on the work of Anderson and Tverdova (2003) and Van Ryzin (2011) by assessing what factors correlate with trust in civil servants, using a broader
range of individual-level and national-level variables than preceding authors. Houston, Aitalieva et al. (2016) used data from 2006 ISSP, the 2006 World Bank Governance Indicators, and the 2006 Corruption Perception Index to assess what factors correlate with trust in civil servants across 21 North American and European countries. The authors included one measure of bureaucratic performance at the individual level, perceptions of government efficacy, and two measures of bureaucratic performance at the country level: government effectiveness based on the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness Indicator, and corruption based on the Corruption Perception Index. In their full model, which included all of the individual-level and country-level variables and demonstrated the best model fit, two of the three measures of bureaucratic performance were statistically significant, corruption and perceptions of government efficacy. Corruption was negatively correlated with trust in civil servants and perceptions of government efficacy were positively correlated with trust in civil servants. These findings are noteworthy given that Houston, Aitalieva et al. (2016) included more individual-level and national-level variables than Anderson and Tverdova (2003) and Van Ryzin (2011).

The results from the aforementioned three studies are limited by the fact that they drew upon cross-sectional data and thus do not permit drawing causal conclusions. Furthermore, all three studies used a single survey item to measure citizens’ trust in civil servants, which is problematic given that “single item measures suffer in terms of reliability and precision” in comparison to multi-item measures (Houston, Aitalieva et al. 2016, p.1212). Despite these limitations, these studies still provide tentative evidence that bureaucratic performance affects citizens’ attitudes towards civil servants.

There is also a fairly robust literature that examines how the performance of specific types of bureaucrats, namely police officers, affects attitudes towards them. Brown and Reed
Benedict (2002), for example, reviewed “findings from more than 100 articles on perceptions of and attitudes towards the police” and concluded that “most research indicates that positive contact with the police improves perceptions of the police, while negative contact has the opposite effect” (pgs. 543 & 551). Brown and Reed Benedict’s (2002) conclusions provide further evidence that attitudes towards bureaucrats are influenced by bureaucratic performance.

Unfortunately, to my knowledge, no literature exists that examines the relationship between teacher performance and attitudes towards teachers. However, given that there is a robust relationship between bureaucratic performance and attitudes towards bureaucrats, there is strong reason to believe that such a relationship exists for teachers as well.

**Bashing and Debates Regarding Public Education**

In the analysis below I assess whether two different types of bashing—bashing of public school teachers by citizens and by elected officials—affects citizens’ attitudes regarding the following five outcomes: (1) support for merit pay for public school teachers, (2) support for a salary increase for public school teachers, (3) support for teacher tenure, (4) the likelihood that citizens’ would recommend a career as a public school teacher to a close friend or family member, and (5) the perceived prestige of public school teachers. I chose these five issues because they are central to debates regarding public education. In the sections below, I briefly contextualize each of these five topics and I explain why they are central to current public discourse regarding public education.

**Merit Pay**

Merit pay for teachers is a performance-based reward in which a portion of teachers’ pay is based on student performance and/or classroom observation (Harvey-Beavis 2003). Merit pay for teachers “was introduced after World War I, but most plans disappeared during the

The successful launch of Sputnik increased concern regarding the quality of science education, and public education more broadly, and many leaders within public education viewed merit pay as a tool for improving public education in the United States and building a competitive advantage over the Soviet Union (McCollum 2001). A Nation at Risk, on the other hand, directly endorsed merit pay for teachers recommending that “teacher salaries be ‘professionally competitive, market-sensitive, and performance-based’” (McCollum 2001, p.22).

Americans are quite supportive of the general idea of merit pay. A nationally representative poll of the American public in 2016 found that 60 percent of the public favors “basing part of the salaries of teachers on how much their students learn” (Peterson, Henderson et al. 2017, p.10). Moreover, both Republicans and Democrats show strong support for merit pay with 67% of Republicans favoring merit pay as compared to 57% among Democrats (Peterson, Henderson et al. 2017).

Although the American public strongly supports the general idea of merit pay, few school districts have implemented merit pay schemes. A recent study found that a mere 3.5 percent of school districts nationwide employ any type of performance pay plan for teachers (Buck and Greene 2011). The low implementation rate of merit pay among public school teachers is due in large part to resistance from teachers themselves and from public sector unions. A nationally representative poll of public school teachers in the U.S. taken in 2016 found that just 20% of public school teachers favored merit pay (Peterson, Henderson et al. 2017).
Though most public school teachers disapprove of merit pay, recent presidents, including Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, have endorsed merit pay systems given their popularity among the American public and given the popularity of the broader teacher accountability movement. Thus, although few school districts have adopted merit pay systems and few public school teachers support merit pay, support for merit pay among political leaders at the highest levels keeps the issue at the forefront of current debates about public education.

**Teacher Salaries**

In public opinion polls, Americans display strong support for raising teacher salaries. A nationally representative poll in 2016 found that 65 percent of the public favors raising the salaries of public school teachers (Peterson, Henderson et al. 2017). Support for raising teachers’ salaries is generally higher among the following groups: teachers versus non teachers, non-homeowners versus homeowners, younger Americans versus older Americans, Democrats versus Republicans, Blacks versus Whites, and Hispanics versus Whites (Peterson, Henderson et al. 2014). Those who approve of raising the salaries of teachers generally present three main arguments in support of their position.

First, teachers’ salaries are lower than the average salary of similarly educated workers. A recent report by the OECD found that in the United States “teachers’ salaries’ are between 57% and 61% of the average salaries of similarly-educated workers” (OECD 2016, p.6). Given both the importance of education for numerous social indicators, and the fact that women are overrepresented in the teaching profession (76 percent of public school teachers are female⁵),

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⁵ https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=28
some argue that the comparatively low salaries of public school teachers are the result of gender discrimination.

In fact, gender bias motivated the integration of women into the teaching profession in the first place, a profession originally dominated by males. Large numbers of women were hired as teachers during the 1820’s as a “money-saving strategy for state and local governments” given that cultural and legal norms allowed women to be paid considerably less than men (Goldstein 2014, p.21). Minimizing the cost of public education was particularly important during this time, given that the prospect of raising taxes to fund public education, or any public program, was a radical idea in light of the recent American Revolution (Goldstein 2014).

Second, many support higher teacher salaries based on the belief that offering competitive salaries is important for attracting talent to the profession. Several studies have found that the comparatively low pay of teachers relative to alternative professions affects the likelihood that college graduates will choose teaching as a profession (Manski 1987, Bacolod 2007, Chevalier, Dolton et al. 2007). This effect is particularly pronounced among persons who scored well on college entrance exams and/or attended selective institutions, given that they generally have more employment opportunities than others (Bacolod 2007). Therefore, offering a higher salary can increase the quality of teachers joining the profession, as measured by standardized test scores and the selectivity of the institutions from which teachers earned their degree, so long as those meeting such criteria are offered jobs at a higher rate than those who do not.

Third, many support raising the salaries of public school teachers based on the belief that raising teachers’ salaries will keep teachers from leaving the profession. Several studies have found that teachers turnover at a lower rate when they are paid more and/or are more satisfied
with their pay (Stinebrickner 1998, Weiss 1999, Imazeki 2005, Kersaint, Lewis et al. 2007, Borman and Dowling 2008, Grissom, Viano et al. 2016). Moreover, the effect of teacher salaries on teacher turnover is likely to be more pronounced for highly effective teachers than for less effective teachers for three main reasons: (1) Highly effective teachers likely have more attractive job opportunities outside of teaching than less effective teachers, (2) “More effective teachers who leave the profession have higher earnings in their new occupations,” and (3) “There is...some evidence that high-performing teachers are more likely to move into educational leadership positions” (Grissom, Viano et al. 2016, p. 246).

Given the importance of teacher salaries for gender equity and for the recruitment and retention of teachers, higher salaries remain central to current debates about public education.

**Teacher Tenure**

Teacher tenure is often misunderstood as a job guarantee. However, as Thomsen (2014) notes, “teacher tenure is...not a job guarantee. Rather, it’s a job security device protecting against termination of employment in cases where there are no grounds for termination or where the teacher has no fair opportunity to present a defense” (p.4). Teacher tenure laws generally come with two provisions, “[1] Continuing employment (i.e. contract renewal) for teachers who have gained tenure status. [2] Due process rights for tenured teachers who are being dismissed” (Thomsen 2014, p.4).

Teacher tenure has a long history in the United States with teachers in New Jersey being the first to win tenure rights in 1909. During the early twentieth century teacher tenure was supported by a diverse coalition of “union leaders, school reformers, and intellectuals” who viewed tenure as a tool for eradicating “politically influenced teacher appointments” (Goldstein 2014, p.85). However, by the late 1960’s education reform advocates began to express concerns
that teacher tenure policies were protecting too many bad teachers from termination (Goldstein 2014). Goldstein (2014) notes that during the late 1960’s, “one of the most cited statistics by supporters of community control was that over a five-year period in the mid-1960’s only 12 out of 55,000 teachers in New York City were fired for cause” (p. 148). Even members of the local teachers union believed that “there were more than 12 bad tenured teachers” (Goldstein 2014, p.148).

Scrutiny of teacher tenure has only increased since the late 1960’s, as a result of declining support for public sector unions and louder calls to hold teachers accountable for student performance. A nationally representative poll of the American public in 2016 found that just 31 percent of the public favors giving tenure to teachers (Peterson, Henderson et al. 2017). Support for teacher tenure is generally higher among the following groups: teachers versus non-teachers, non-homeowners versus homeowners, younger Americans versus older Americans, Democrats versus Republicans, Blacks versus Whites, and Hispanics versus Whites (Peterson, Henderson et al. 2014).

Furthermore, historically, “teachers have been awarded tenure virtually automatically, after a few years (usually three or less) on the job,” however, an increasing number of states are requiring that teacher tenure decisions be tied to teacher performance (Jacobs, Doherty et al. 2015, p.iv). In 2009, no states had such policies, but by 2015, 23 states had them (Jacobs, Doherty et al. 2015). Given that support for teacher tenure is low and yet the majority of states award teacher tenure virtually automatically, many politicians champion ending or curtailing teacher tenure as a means to gain popular support. The efforts of these political entrepreneurs keeps the issue of teacher tenure at the forefront of debates regarding public education.
Recommending a Career as A Public School Teacher

Attracting talent into the teaching profession is important given that scholars have found that teachers have a long-lasting impact on students’ socioeconomic outcomes (Chetty, Friedman et al. 2011, Chetty, Friedman et al. 2014). Chetty, Friedman et al. (2014) were able to estimate the impact of teachers on students’ outcomes later in life by “linking information from an administrative dataset on students and teachers…with selected data from United States tax records” (p. 2634). The authors used the value-added (VA) approach which “evaluate[s] teachers based on their impacts on students' test scores” (p. 2633). Chetty, Friedman et al. (2014) were able to “track approximately one million individuals from elementary school into early adulthood” and found that “students assigned to high-VA teachers are more likely to attend college, earn higher salaries, and are less likely to have children as teenagers” (p. 2633-2634).

One action that might help increase the number of talented public school teachers is to increase the number of people willing to recommend a career as a teacher to others. A series of opinion polls conducted by the professional organization for educators, Phi Delta Kappa (PDK), provides some important insights regarding the willingness of Americans’ to encourage others to pursue a career in teaching.

In 2011, PDK fielded a nationally representative survey that asked Americans the following question:

“Suppose the brightest person you know said he or she would like to be a teacher. What would you most likely do: Encourage that person, discourage that person, or suggest that he or she consider other fields before deciding?” (Bushaw and Lopez 2011, p.10).

Seventy-four percent of respondents stated that they would encourage that person to be a teacher, twenty-three percent stated that they would suggest a different field, only two percent stated they
would discourage that person from becoming a teacher, and one percent stated that they didn’t know or refused (Bushaw and Lopez 2011).

Very similar results were found when the same question was asked by PDK in May of 1996. Seventy-three percent, stated that they would encourage that person to become a teacher (Bushaw and Lopez 2011). Teachers, however, were less likely than the general public to state that they would encourage that person to become a teacher, with only 46 percent of teachers registering that response (Langdon 1996). Furthermore, teachers were more likely than the general public to state that they would discourage that person from becoming a teacher with eight percent of teachers registering that response versus two percent among the general public (Langdon 1996). Lastly, teachers were more likely than the general public to state they would suggest a different field, 42 percent of teachers registered that response versus 23 percent among the general public. It is important to note, however, that the sample size of the aforementioned poll was relatively small, consisting of just 510 respondents.

Although the 1996 PDK poll employed a small sample size, a survey of public school teachers from the state of Georgia seems to give credence to the PDK poll’s finding that teachers are reluctant to recommend their profession to others. In November of 2015, the Georgia Department of Education fielded a short survey to Georgia public school teachers, and one of the questions asked teachers the following, “If you had a student about to graduate from high school, how likely would you be to encourage teaching as a profession?” (Owens 2015, p.2). Approximately 70 percent of teachers “answered that they are either unlikely or very unlikely to encourage graduates to pursue teaching” (Owens 2015, p.2).

While teachers and members of the general public would be expected to differ in their likelihood of encouraging others to pursue a career in teaching, polling data suggest that
Americans without children in public schools do not differ from Americans with children in public schools on this question (Database). Results from a PDK poll conducted in August of 1996 found that there was only a two percent difference between adults without children in school, adults with children in public schools, and adults with children in non-public schools on how likely they would be to encourage the brightest person they know to become a teacher, if they were interested (Database). Seventy-two percent of public school parents said that they would encourage that person to become a teacher versus 74 percent among both adults without children in school and adults with children in non-public schools (Database).

Given that “college graduates with higher measured academic ability [are] less likely to enter teaching than…other graduates” and given that teachers impact students’ long-term socioeconomic outcomes, efforts to recruit more people into the teaching profession are of great interest to practitioners and policymakers (Guarino, Santibanez et al. 2006, p.200).

**Perceived Prestige**

Perceived prestige is generally defined as what an individual believes others think about a profession (Brown, Dacin et al. 2006). Surveys are the main way scholars investigate how the public rates the prestige of various professions. In 2015, for example, The Harris Poll asked a representative sample of Americans to state how much prestige they find in a variety of occupations. Sixty-five percent of respondents stated that being a teacher has a great deal of prestige, a higher percentage than said the same of lawyers, entrepreneurs, accountants, and business executives\(^6\). Yet, being a teacher was rated less prestigious than being a doctor, scientist, military officer, nurse, or police officer, for example\(^7\).

\(^6\) [http://media.theharrispoll.com/documents/Prestigious+Occupations_Data+Tables.pdf](http://media.theharrispoll.com/documents/Prestigious+Occupations_Data+Tables.pdf)

\(^7\) [http://media.theharrispoll.com/documents/Prestigious+Occupations_Data+Tables.pdf](http://media.theharrispoll.com/documents/Prestigious+Occupations_Data+Tables.pdf)
The Standard International Occupational Prestige Scales (SIOPS) is another tool that has been used to measure occupational prestige, based on data from 85 studies of occupational prestige from 60 countries (Hargreaves 2009). SIOPS accumulated data on occupational prestige in 1977 and 1996, and the occupation prestige score assigned to teaching was consistent over the two time periods (Hargreaves 2009). The occupational prestige score for teachers was “relatively high compared with other public service occupations (nursing, social work, police) but lower than the major professions (medicine, law and architecture)” (Hargreaves 2009, p.219).

Hoyle (2001) contends that three broad factors work to depress the prestige of teachers. First, the sheer size of the number of pupils that need to be taught enhances the size of the profession. The size of the teaching profession, along with the fact most teachers are financed by the public purse, serves to constrain the salaries of teachers (Hoyle 2001). Constraints on the salaries of teachers negatively affect the quality of those entering the teaching profession. The quality and skillset of teachers influences perceptions regarding the prestige of the profession.

Second, Hoyle (2001) argues that the nature of the relationship between teachers and their pupils is unique in ways that damage the prestige of the profession. For example, teachers must grapple with an “ever-present need to maintain control [of their classroom], and the consequences of even the partial loss of control” weaken the prestige of the profession (Hoyle 2001). Furthermore, pupils eventually leave their teachers behind, and forever associate them “with their childhood rather than their adulthood” (Hargreaves 2009, p. 222).

Third, Hoyle (2001) contends that “the goals of education are diverse and diffuse” which serves to lower the prestige of teachers since “specialization is still the dominant source of prestige” (p. 141).
Clearly, the prestige of teaching as a profession is relevant to teacher recruitment and retention. One of the most oft-repeated ideas for raising the prestige of teachers is to increase teacher pay, given that the other elements of Hoyle’s (2001) model are difficult to modify.

**Research Design**

I conducted a survey experiment to test both the effects of bashing and the effects of praise on citizens’ attitudes towards public school teachers. I chose to examine the effects of both bashing and praise on citizens’ attitudes, not solely bashing, because both phenomena exist in the ‘real world,’ and thus understanding both types of responses allows for a richer and more precise analysis.

I chose to employ a survey experiment to examine my research question because “experimental designs provide a solution to the problem of endogeneity” (Bouwman and Grimmelikhuijsen 2016, p.111). Endogeneity may stem from a variety of causes that are all too common in observational studies, including omitted variable bias, two-way causation, selection effects, and common method bias (Druckman, Green et al. 2006, Bouwman and Grimmelikhuijsen 2016). In fact, concerns regarding common method bias have yielded a flurry of articles over the past decade in the public administration literature, aiming to assess and address this threat (Meier and O’Toole 2013, Favero and Bullock 2015, Jakobsen and Jensen 2015). The number of articles in public administration and political science using an experimental approach has increased dramatically over the past decade, due in part to increased concern regarding the problem of endogeneity (Druckman, Green et al. 2006, Grimmelikhuijsen, Jilke et al. 2017).

Participants in my survey experiment were randomly assigned to a control group or to a treatment in-group, in which subjects read one of four statements regarding public school
teachers. The four statements vary along two dimensions: (1) the actor making the statement, and (2) the tone of the statement made by the actor. The actor making the statement was defined as either ‘elected officials’ or local ‘citizens.’ The tone of the statement was either ‘praise’ or ‘bashing.’ Each treatment group read statements with information that was untrue and made up by the author. Table 1 below details the study’s experimental conditions.

Table 1

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Note: The experiment uses a 2×2 factorial design with a control group, resulting in 4 treatment groups plus one control group, for a total of 5 groups. Subjects were randomly assigned to a treatment group or to the control group.

As illustrated in table 1 above, my study contained a total of five experimental groups: 4 treatment groups and one control group. All subjects—both those assigned to one of the treatment groups and those assigned to the control group—began by reading the study information sheet which detailed information regarding eligibility guidelines, the purpose of the study, and procedures for the study. After reading the study information sheet, subjects in the control group proceeded directly to answering questions regarding their opinions towards public school teachers. Subjects in the treatment group, by contrast, read one of four statements about public school teachers, and then proceeded to answer questions regarding their opinions towards public school teachers. After answering these questions, subjects in the treatment group received information which detailed the intent of the study and revealed that the statements that respondents read were untrue and made up by the author. Figure 1 below illustrates the process for both the treatment groups and the control group.
The four statements that were randomly assigned to the treatment groups can be found in Appendix A. Each of the four statements began by claiming that “A research team made up of professors from three Ivy League universities recently fielded surveys asking Americans what they have heard (1) ‘citizens in their community’ or (2) ‘elected officials’ say about public school teachers.” The statement went on to say that “Their results show that Americans heard mostly (1) ‘negative’ or (2) ‘positive’ comments about public school teachers from (1) ‘citizens in their community’ or (2) ‘elected officials,’” depending on whether respondents were assigned to the “citizens” or “elected officials” treatment and whether they were assigned to a “bashing” or “praise” condition. The last two sentences of the statements reads as follows “Many respondents reported hearing comments suggesting that public school teachers are (1) ‘lazy, incompetent, unaccountable, and self-serving’ or (2) ‘hardworking, competent, held accountable, and selfless.’ The results from this study will be published in a forthcoming issue of the American Education Research Journal (AERJ).”
The benefit of this research design is that it refers to elected officials and citizens in a general sense, not to specific elected officials or to specific citizens—given that doing so would make it impossible to discern whether the findings are specific to the particular citizens or elected officials mentioned in the contrived statement. Furthermore, using highly general language about the citizens, elected officials, and Ivy League universities mentioned in the statement makes it more difficult for respondents to determine that the statement that was provided to them is untrue. Another benefit of this research design is that it could easily be applied to other public professions given that there is nothing in the statements that is specific to public school teachers other than the phrase “public school teachers.”

**Dependent Variables**

Five dependent variables were assessed in this study. I measured the first dependent variable, support for merit pay, using the following survey item: “Do you favor or oppose basing the salaries of teachers around the nation, in part, on their students' academic progress on state tests?” The response options were based on a five-point scale from (1) completely oppose to (5) completely favor.

I measured the second dependent variable, support for raising teachers’ salaries, using the following survey item: “Do you think that salaries for public school teachers in the United States should increase, decrease, or stay about the same?” The response options were based on a five-point scale from (1) greatly decrease to (5) greatly increase.

I measured the third dependent variable, support for teacher tenure, using the following survey item: “Teachers with tenure cannot be dismissed unless a school district follows detailed procedures. Some say that tenure protects teachers from being fired for arbitrary reasons. Others say that it makes it too difficult to replace ineffective teachers. We want to
know what you think of tenure. Do you favor or oppose offering tenure to public school teachers across the country?” The response options were based on a five-point scale from (1) completely oppose to (5) completely favor.

I measured the fourth dependent variable, the likelihood that respondents would recommend a career as a public school teacher to a close friend or family member, using the following survey item: “What are the chances that you would recommend a career as a PUBLIC school teacher to a close family member? You may choose any number from 0 to 100.” Respondents were allowed to choose any number between one and one hundred through sliding a bar to register their answer.

I measured the fifth dependent variable, perceived prestige, using three survey items that read as follows: (1) “In general, others respect public school teachers,” (2) “Generally, public school teachers have a good overall image,” and (3) “Generally, people in this country think highly of public school teachers.” The response options were based on a seven-point scale from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. The three survey-items demonstrated high internal consistency with a Cronbach’s alpha of α=.95.

Data

I recruited 660 U.S. residents aged 18 and older to participate in the survey experiment, from Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, or MTurk as it is commonly known. Recruiting respondents from MTurk for participation in survey experiments is quite common in public administration scholarship (Stritch, Pedersen et al. 2017), and in the social sciences more broadly (Paolacci and Chandler 2014), and represents an improvement over college samples which are significantly less diverse than the MTurk pool. Moreover, scholars have found that MTurk workers “appear to be truthful when providing self-report information” and as attentive when
answering questions as respondents from other online samples (Paolacci and Chandler 2014, p. 186).

Descriptive statistics of my sample can be found in table 2 below. My sample is not representative of the U.S. population, however, representative samples are only necessary when estimating “descriptive population parameters,” not “causal effects,” which is my intention here (Marvel 2014, p. 717). Nonetheless, my sample is diverse in regards to every demographic category except for race. Lack of racial diversity, unfortunately, is typical in experimental research given that Blacks and Hispanics are underrepresented in online samples (Berinsky, Huber et al. 2012). Most crucial is that my sample demonstrates diversity of party identification, gender, and parental status, given that I expect the experimental effects to differ within these subgroups.

Prior research has found that women, Democrats, and parents of children under the age of 18 are generally more supportive of teachers and public education than are men, Republicans, and persons without children under the age of 18 (Berkman and Plutzer 2005, Peterson, Henderson et al. 2014). Consequently, I expect women, Democrats, and parents of children under the age of 18 to be more receptive to praise statements about teachers and less receptive to bashing statements about teachers than men, Republicans, and people without children under the age of 18. I also expect the reverse to be true: I anticipate that men, Republicans, and people without children under the age of 18 will be more receptive to bashing statements about teachers and less receptive to praise statements about teachers than women, Democrats, and parents of children under the age of 18.

Regarding gender, my sample is even, with 50 percent of the sample being men and 50 percent being women. Party identification is even as well, with approximately 44 percent of
respondents identifying as Democrats, 44 percent identifying as Republicans, and 12 percent identifying with neither party. Lastly, approximately 59 percent of the sample has children under the age of 18, and 41 percent does not.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Gender</th>
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<table>
<thead>
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<td>Republican</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moderate, middle of the road</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<table>
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<td>41.2</td>
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<td>30-39</td>
<td>37.3</td>
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<td>40-59</td>
<td>28.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>60 or older</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<td>Some college, but no degree (yet)</td>
<td>24.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-year college degree</td>
<td>11.5</td>
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<td>4-year college degree or more</td>
<td>49.7</td>
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## Household Income Range

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<td>$10k to $39,999</td>
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</tr>
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<td>$40 to $69,999</td>
<td>30.9</td>
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<td>$70k to $99,999</td>
<td>16.8</td>
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<td>Over $100k</td>
<td>10.6</td>
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## Race / Ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>White</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiracial, Some other race, ethnicity, or origin</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian/Alaskan Native</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern or North African</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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</table>

## Results

I ran an ANOVA model and employed an independent samples *t*-test in which I compared the control group mean to the treatment group mean for all five independent variables and all four treatment conditions. Figure 2 below displays the results from the question “Do you favor or oppose basing the salaries of teachers around the nation, in part, on their students' academic progress on state tests?” The mean response regarding how much each group favors merit pay for public school teachers is as follows: for the control group a mean of 2.54, for the bashing treatment from citizens a mean of 2.55, for the bashing treatment from elected officials a mean of 2.43, for the praise treatment from citizens a mean of 2.67, and for the praise treatment for elected officials a mean of 2.64.
The group that received a bashing treatment from citizens displayed higher mean support for merit pay than the control group, whereas the group that received a bashing treatment from elected officials displayed lower mean support than the control group. Neither bashing treatment had a statistically significant effect on support for merit pay. Both praise treatment groups displayed higher mean support for merit pay than the control group. However, neither praise treatment had a statistically significant effect on support for merit pay.

**Figure 2**

Note: The control group is the comparison category for all significance tests.

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Figure 3 below displays the results from the question “Do you think that salaries for public school teachers in the United States should increase, decrease, or stay about the same?” The mean response regarding how much each group favors a salary increase for public school teachers is as follows: for the control group a mean of 4.03, for the bashing treatment from citizens a mean of 3.98, for the bashing treatment from elected officials a mean of 3.93, for the praise treatment from citizens a mean of 3.97, and for the praise treatment from elected officials a mean of 3.99. Both bashing treatment groups displayed lower mean support for a salary increase than the control group, however, neither bashing treatment had a statistically significant
effect on support for a salary increase. Both praise treatment groups actually displayed lower mean support for a salary increase than the control group, however, neither praise treatment had a statistically significant effect on support for a salary increase.

**Figure 3**

![Graph showing favor a salary increase](image)

Note: The control group is the comparison category for all significance tests. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Figure 4 below displays the results from the question “Teachers with tenure cannot be dismissed unless a school district follows detailed procedures. Some say that tenure protects teachers from being fired for arbitrary reasons. Others say that it makes it too difficult to replace ineffective teachers. We want to know what you think of tenure. Do you favor or oppose offering tenure to public school teachers across the country?” The mean response regarding how much each group favors tenure is as follows: for the control group a mean of 2.83, for the bashing treatment from citizens a mean of 2.51, for the bashing treatment from elected officials a mean of 2.77, for the praise treatment from citizens a mean of 2.83, and for the praise treatment from elected officials a mean of 2.71.
Both bashing treatment groups displayed lower mean support for tenure than the control group, however, only the bashing treatment from citizens reached statistical significance (**p < .01). Neither praise treatment increased support for tenure. The praise treatment from citizens displayed the same mean support for tenure as the control group, and the praise treatment from elected officials actually displayed lower mean support for tenure than the control group.

Neither praise treatment had a statistically significant effect on support for tenure.

Figure 4

Note: The control group is the comparison category for all significance tests. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Figure 5 below displays the results from the question “What are the chances that you would recommend a career as a PUBLIC school teacher to a close family member? You may choose any number from 0 to 100.” The mean response regarding the likelihood that each group would recommend a career as a public school teacher is as follows: for the control group a 47% chance, for the bashing treatment from citizens a 38% chance, for the bashing treatment from elected officials a 46% chance, for the praise treatment from citizens a 51% chance, and for the praise treatment from elected officials a 47% chance. Both bashing treatments displayed a lower mean chance that respondents would recommend a career as a public school teacher than the
control group, however, only the bashing treatment from citizens reached statistical significance (\(**p < .01\)). The group that received a praise treatment from citizens displayed a higher mean chance that respondents would recommend a career as a public school teacher than the control group. The group that received a praise treatment from elected officials displayed the same mean chance that respondents would recommend a career as a public school teacher as the control group. Neither praise treatment had a statistically significant effect on the chances that respondents would recommend a career as a public school teacher.

Figure 5

![Bar chart showing chances of recommending a career as a public school teacher](image)

Note: The control group is the comparison category for all significance tests.

\[*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001*

Figure 6 below displays the results from the following three questions that measure respondents’ perceived prestige of being a public school teacher: (1) “In general, others respect public school teachers,” (2) “Generally, public school teachers have a good overall image,” and (3) “Generally, people in this country think highly of public school teachers.” The mean response regarding the perceived prestige of being a public school teacher for each group is as follows: for the control group 0.02, for the bashing treatment from citizens -0.86, for the bashing
treatment from elected officials -0.45, for the praise treatment from citizens 0.72, and for the praise treatment from elected officials 0.57.

Both bashing treatments displayed lower mean values regarding the perceived prestige of being a public school teacher than the control group, and both bashing treatments had a statistically significant effect on respondents’ perceived prestige (**p < .001). Both praise treatments displayed higher mean value regarding the perceived prestige of being a public school teacher than the control group, however, neither praise treatment had a statistically significant effect on respondents’ perceived prestige.

**Figure 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Bashing From Citizens</th>
<th>Bashing From Elected Officials</th>
<th>Praise From Citizens</th>
<th>Praise From Elected Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.86**</td>
<td>-0.45**</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The control group is the comparison category for all significance tests.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 3 below displays the mean responses and effect sizes for all four treatment groups and all five dependent variables. The praise treatments did not have a statistically significant effect on subjects’ responses to any of the five dependent variables. Conversely, bashing from citizens had a statistically significant effect on three outcomes: support for tenure, the likelihood that respondents would recommend a career as a public school teacher, and respondents
perceived prestige of a career as a public school teacher. Bashing from citizens lowered mean responses for all three of the aforementioned dependent variables relative to the control group. Bashing from elected officials had a statistically significant effect on one outcome: respondents’ perceived prestige of a career as a public school teacher. Bashing from elected officials lowered respondents’ perceived prestige of a career as a public school teacher relative to the control group.

**Table 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group means</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Bashing Citizens</th>
<th>Bashing Elected Officials</th>
<th>Praise Citizens</th>
<th>Praise Elected Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favor Merit Pay</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>2.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor Salary Increase</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>3.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor Tenure</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>2.51** (d=.29)</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommend Career</td>
<td>46.68</td>
<td>37.63** (d=.31)</td>
<td>46.28</td>
<td>51.18</td>
<td>47.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Prestige</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-.86*** (d=.98)</td>
<td>-.45*** (d=.54)</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The control group is the comparison category for all significance tests.
N = 231 Republicans, 278 Democrats.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

**Conclusion**

This experiment confirms the idea that bureaucrat-bashing, in this case the bashing of public school teachers, is not without consequences. Bureaucrat-bashing from citizens reduces support for tenure, the likelihood that respondents’ would recommend a career as a public school teacher, and respondents’ perceived prestige of a career as a public school teacher. Bureaucrat-bashing from elected officials reduces respondents’ perceived prestige of a career as a public school teacher. These findings suggest that bureaucrat-bashing may undermine efforts to recruitment and retain to workers in the public sector. Specifically it compromises efforts to
recruit and retain public school teachers, given that encouraging others to join the teaching profession, and the profession’s perceived prestige, are important motivators.

It is also important to note that bureaucrat-bashing from citizens had a statistically significant effect on more of the dependent variables than did bureaucrat-bashing from elected officials. As was mentioned in the literature review, Americans are more trusting of the ‘American people’ in the aggregate than they are of ‘politicians.’ The finding that bureaucrat-bashing from citizens has a statistically significant effect on more of the dependent variables than bureaucrat-bashing from elected officials supports source credibility theory.

Neither praise treatment had a statistically significant effect on any of the dependent variables in the study, which seems to confirm negativity bias—that negative information weighs more heavily on the brain than positive information or neutral information (Ito, Larsen et al. 1998). My findings here suggest that negativity bias may be distorting the value of public service, specifically the work of public school teachers.

Given that it may be difficult to reduce bureaucrat-bashing, there are several steps that public employees can take to make positive information about their performance more persuasive, so as to counteract negativity bias and enhance support for work in the public sector. First, it is important for public employees to tell stories about successful performance, and not simply to report performance statistics. Research by Olsen (2017) has found that individuals are better able to recall performance information in the form of personalized stories and experiences than in the form of statistics. Second, it is important for public employees to publicize positive performance information, particularly from non-governmental agencies, given that individuals are more doubtful of good performance reported by government agencies themselves than by independent agencies (James and Van Ryzin 2017). Lastly, it is important for public employees
to report comparative performance information, not just reflexive performance information (i.e. year over year) given that research has found that comparative performance information weighs more heavily on individuals judgements of performance than reflexive performance information (Charbonneau and Van Ryzin 2015).

This survey experiment is not without limitations. First, like most survey experiments, this was a one-shot experiment. Consequently, it is unclear how long the treatment effects will endure. Nonetheless, finding that the bashing of teachers does affect citizens’ attitudes, no matter for how long, is novel and represents a significant contribution in and of itself.

Second, this experiment, as with all experiments, may generate some concerns about external validity. In other words, does this experiment reflect how individuals experience bureaucrat-bashing and bureaucrat praise in real life? I contend that at its core it does. This experiment contains the two core elements of bureaucrat-bashing and bureaucrat praise: (1) an actor making a statement, and (2) a statement that challenges or praises a bureaucrat’s work ethic, accountability, motives, and/or competence. Every instance of bureaucrat-bashing or bureaucrat praise, in real life, contains these two core elements. Thus, this design accurately reflects how people experience bureaucrat-bashing and bureaucrat praise.

Lastly, the statistical power for some of the treatment groups was quite low, far less than the recommended power of .80. Please see Appendix B for a detailed power analysis for all of the experimental conditions. Given that there is no prior literature that quantitatively examines the impact of bureaucrat-bashing, it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the proper sample size for each experimental condition prior to embarking on this study. For some of the experimental conditions I can achieve the proper power (.80 or higher) by adding a few
hundred more subjects to my study, whereas some of the other experimental conditions require several thousand more respondents to achieve the proper power size.
Appendix A

Citizen Bashing Statement
A research team made up of professors from three Ivy League universities recently fielded surveys asking Americans what they have heard citizens in their community say about public school teachers. Their results show that Americans heard mostly negative comments about public school teachers from citizens in their community. Many respondents reported hearing comments suggesting that public school teachers are lazy, incompetent, unaccountable, and self-serving. The results from this study will be published in a forthcoming issue of the American Education Research Journal (AERJ).

Citizen Praise Statement
A research team made up of professors from three Ivy League universities recently fielded surveys asking Americans what they have heard citizens in their community say about public school teachers. Their results show that Americans heard mostly positive comments about public school teachers from citizens in their community. Many respondents reported hearing comments suggesting that public school teachers are hardworking, competent, held accountable, and selfless. The results from this study will be published in a forthcoming issue of the American Education Research Journal (AERJ).
Elected Officials Praise Statement
A research team made up of professors from three Ivy League universities recently fielded surveys asking Americans what they have heard elected officials say about public school teachers. Their results show that Americans heard mostly positive comments about public school teachers from elected officials. Many respondents reported hearing comments suggesting that public school teachers are hardworking, competent, held accountable, and selfless. The results from this study will be published in a forthcoming issue of the American Education Research Journal (AERJ).

Elected Officials Bashing Statement
A research team made up of professors from three Ivy League universities recently fielded surveys asking Americans what they have heard elected officials say about public school teachers. Their results show that Americans heard mostly negative comments about public school teachers from elected officials. Many respondents reported hearing comments suggesting that public school teachers are lazy, incompetent, unaccountable, and self-serving. The results from this study will be published in a forthcoming issue of the American Education Research Journal (AERJ).
### Appendix B

**Power Analysis - Experiment #1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Bashing Citizens</th>
<th>Bashing Elected Officials</th>
<th>Praise Citizens</th>
<th>Praise Elected Officials</th>
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<tr>
<td>Recommend Career</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
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<td>0.14</td>
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**Sample Size Needed To Detect 80% Power - Experiment #1**

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<td>1,426</td>
<td>120,846</td>
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<td>Public Image</td>
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<td>106</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3,800</td>
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<td>4,870</td>
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<td>11,262</td>
<td>9,677,646</td>
<td>2,590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Works Cited


Database, P. t. N. t. U. S. "Suppose the brightest person you know said that he or she would like to be a teacher. What would you most likely do - encourage that person, discourage that person, or suggest that he or she consider other fields before deciding?" Phi Delta Kappa. Retrieved 14 April, 2017, from http://www.orspub.com/document.php?id=quest96.out_26731&type=hitlist(num=14).


